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In spite of all restrictions and
frustrations, Coursey left Albany with an illusion of ultimate triumph.
He had finally made contact with the elusive Iroquois and had provided
for meeting them again on better terms. He did get what he thought was a
full and final peace embracing Virginia and his Indian allies as well as
Maryland. The danger of a LenapeSusquehannock confederacy had been
circumvented, it seemed. At Albany, Coursey succeeded, as he thought, in
two particular accomplishments: the Lenape became obligated by the terms
of the peace even though they had not spoken formally at the conference;
and the Susquehannock's lost diplomatic recognition as a nation capable
of speaking for themselves.110
Coursey had yet one more reason for satisfactionperhaps the best one.
Lord Baltimore had been in London answering official questions ever
since the outbreak of all the violence in 1675. The same Protestant
politicians who wanted to bring down James Stuart also menaced
Baltimore's government of his province. Complaints about Baltimore's
bias against Protestants in Maryland were supplemented by his evident
inability to protect his back settlers from Indians. To stall hostile
action Baltimore lied boldly to the Privy Council's Committee of Trade
and Plantations. He told the Lords in 1677 that the "Peace with the
Northern Indians bordering upon his Province has held for twenty years
and is yearly confirmed by the Indians." Embarrassingly, he was asked
for evidence. Coursey's treaty at Albany at last gave Baltimore
something in writing to offer the Lords. The treaty did not confirm his
words, but it did at least seem to show signs of effort and
accomplishment in relations with the Indians.111 Perhaps Coursey's
treaty weighed in the final decision to let Baltimore keep his
government. If so, the treaty served in this regard only to postpone,
not to eliminate, Baltimore's loss of his government. What the Lords
failed to take in 1677, Maryland's people would seize in 1689. They,
too, were dissatisfied with the effects of Baltimore's Indian policies.
Coursey's companion and interpreter, Jacob Young, found no comfort at
all in the treaty. Young had been more than a trader among the
Susquehannock's. An Onondaga spokesman disclosed that Jacob Young had
been "a great Leader and Captain" in the prolonged SusquehannockIroquois
wars. Maliciously the Onondagan added that Young had been "a great
occasion" of the Iroquois attacks on both Christians and Indians. (It
may be noted that, though Coursey's Instructions had been to curry favor
with the Iroquois by blaming the Susquehannock's for backwoods killings,
the Iroquois matteroffactly admitted their culpability.)112 Young could
see the implications for himself of Maryland's acquiescence in the
Susquehannock's' disappearance into Iroquoia. Young's business was at
the Chesapeake; the business would depart with its patrons. Perhaps
Young also had become Indian enough to feel humiliated by the legal
extinction of the nation he had led and befriended. He mourned to
Coursey, "If he had known before coming that the Susquehannock's were
not to be included in the peace, he would rather have given 20,000
pounds of tobacco than to come." Coursey remembered the remark and
turned it against Young on a later occasion.113
We have called Coursey's triumph an illusion. Now it remains to be seen
who actually won the peace. The curious fact is that all the other
participantseven the silent Susquehannock's and Lenapegained more than
Maryland. Andros preserved New York's monopoly on negotiations with the
Indians of his government. As he had gained some of New England's
Indians with his "tree of peace" at Scaticook, now he gained the
manpower and furtrading expertise of the Susquehannock's. The Iroquois
gained the warriors they so badly needed. The Susquehannock's everywhere
gained sanctuary from Maryland. Both the Lenape and the Susquehannock's
at Delaware Bay were relieved of the menace of attack from Maryland, and
with the signing of the treaty Andros relaxed his efforts to make the
remaining Susquehannock's at the Bay remove elsewhere.114
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Notes: |
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110 |
Proclamation
of treaty terms, 5 Oct., 1677, Md. Arch. (Council) 15: p. 157. |
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111 |
Minutes of
Committee for Trade and Plantations, 10 April, 1676; 18 Dec.,
1677; 26 March, 1678; 15 April, 1678, Md. Arch. (PRO) 5: pp.
125—130, 263, 264, 258, 269. |
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112 |
Treaty
minutes, 21 July, 1677, Md. Arch. (PRO) 5: p. 255. |
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113 |
Trial
findings, 19 Oct., 1683, Md. Arch. (Upper House) 7: p. 475. |
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114 |
A piece of evidence, seeming to support the Iroquois conquest myth,
must be accounted for. The Onondagas mentioned at Albany that
warriors of their "four Castelles of ye Senikars" were "out a
fighting aganst the Susquahannas." Livingston Indian Records, p.
44. In the confused terminology of the time, "Senikars" might
mean only the Senecas proper or it might mean all the nonMohawk
Iroquois, and the fact that the remark was made by an Onondagan
makes the more comprehensive interpretation more probably
correct. (See n. 103.) The remark may be explained by reference
to the disunited state of the Susquehannocks. As we have seen,
some of them elected to join the Iroquois while others joined
the Lenape. Apparently a few still stubbornly refused to
incorporate with any larger nation. It was these holdouts that
the Iroquois forced into submission, with Andros' apparent
consent. See Donald A. Cadzow, Archaeological Studies of the
Susquehannock Indians of Pennsylvania, Safe Harbor Report No. 2,
Pennsylvania Hist. Corn. PubI. 3 (Harrisburg, 1936) : p. 37. |
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