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    Glory, Death, And Transfiguration: 
The Susquehannock Indians In The Seventeenth Century
     

 

 

Duch Power

 
   
   

Chief Piercing Eyes
Introduction
Prehistory
Neighboring Peoples
Lenape Tributaries
Map 1
Susquehannock Ascendancy
Map 2
Map 3
Dutch Power
English-Dutch-Conflict
Iroquois Defeads
English Conquest
Temporary Peace
The Whorekill Raids
Maryland's New Indian Policy
Susquehannock Removal Into Maryland
Attack On The Susquehannock Fort
Andros' Indian Policies
Andros' Protection
Andros' Ultimatums
Explanation Of The Intrigues
The Treaty Of Shackamaxon
The Treaty Of Albany
Results of The Albany Treaty
Forging Of The Covenant Chain
Susquehannock Revenge
Beginnings Of Pennsylvania
Significance Of Penn's Indians Deeds
Map 4
Jacob Young's Predicament
Origin Of The Iroquois Conquest Myth
Re: Emergence Of Susquehannock Polity
Appendix: Lenape Ownership Of Delaware
   
   
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At the marketing end of the Indian trading cycle, the European colonists at the center of everything were the Dutch. New Netherland's whole reason for existence was the Indian trade. When something happened to the Dutch, therefore, whether its source lay in Europe, colonies, or Indian country, its effects reverberated through the tribes. The Susquehannock's were no exception to this rule. If Dutch interests and Dutch activities are examined closely, they reveal the clues needed to understand Susquehannock history.

We may begin with the crisis presented to the traders of New Netherland in 1642. In the background of the crisis lay the fact that so long as the Indians of the far west had had to journey all the way to Three Rivers or Quebec for a French market, the Iroquois could hope to intercept and share in the trade, and the Iroquois would bring their share to Rensselaerswyck. But the French founded Montreal in 1642 and thereby overleaped Iroquois obstruction.25  Since the Mohawks would not permit the western tribes to trade directly with Rensselaerswyck, the effect of the founding of Montreal was to cut off western peltry from the Dutch on the Hudson.26

The trade of the Connecticut valley had been ruined several years previously by trading posts of New Englanders at Windsor and Hartford. Now, coincidentally with the founding of Montreal, the New Sweden Company was reorganized to compete more aggressively for trade at the Delaware Bay. Governor Johan Printz took charge of the Swedish colony and built a series of blockhouses to intercept Susquehannock trade; in 1644 or 1645, he sent an embassy to Susquehannock country to negotiate a monopoly of the trade for Sweden, thus cutting off western peltry from the Dutch on the Delaware.27

At the same time, many of the Indians of the Hudson valley and Long Island grew resentful at Dutch ill treatment, and in 1643 they rose in fierce rebellion. New Netherland was in trouble in every direction. It is no wonder, then, that the Dutch found it politic to make their first treaty of peace and friendship with the Mohawks in 1643, and to renew it in 1645.28 For the Dutch, these treaties bought Mohawk intervention in their Indian war, which in turn brought the belligerents to a peace treaty. For the Mohawks, the treaties gained the right to trade for guns and ammunition on an unprecedented scale. Dutch arms were the decisive factor in the Iroquois triumph over the Hurons in 1649 and 1650, and there can be little doubt that Dutch logistics also supported the Mohawk attack on the Susquehannock's in 1651-1652.29   Though the Dutch mistrusted the Mohawks, fearing lest the latter get out of hand, the essential fact was that the Mohawks were serving Dutch interests by pursuing their own.30   Mohawk peacemaking between the Dutch and the other Indians increased Mohawk prestige.31   The Mohawk triumph in Huronia promised to divert some of the western furs to Rensselaerswyck. The Mohawk battle against the Susquehannock's was indirectly a battle against the Swedish backers of the Susquehannock's.

While the Mohawks were thus doing Dutch business, the Susquehannock's compounded their offenses against the Dutch by leaguing with yet another hostile power to strengthen themselves against the Dutchaligned Mohawks. In 1652 the Susquehannock's made a treaty of peace with English Maryland.32   Now we must remember that 1652 marked the beginning of the first AngloDutch war, and during that war the Delaware Bay Swedes seized their opportunity and the contiguous Dutch real estate.33   Though the war ended in 1654, the Swedes remained for a while in possession of all of Delaware Bay. They had timed their seizure well, and their Susquehannock allies and trading partners continued to be their main source of strength and profit.

It is not hard to imagine the Dutch being somewhat displeased with the Susquehannock's. Our clue lies in a Swedish document. Governor Johan Rising reported to Sweden that his Lenape neighbors on Delaware Bay had become "very proud"insufferably soand that he could do nothing but appease them unless Sweden would send him troops. Appeasement took the form of giving goods on credit to the Lenape, which they then traded to the Susquehannocks for the latter's peltry; the Lenape completed their brokerage by selling the furs in New Amsterdam for higher prices than the Swedes would pay. That the Susquehannocks did not do their own trading at New Amsterdam bespeaks exclusion from the Dutch market. For the time being, the tributary Lenape (if they still were tributary) had the only access to the best market, and the Susquehannocks' fortunesalready damaged by their Mohawk warcontinued to decline.34

Worse was in store. The Dutch reconquered Delaware Bay in 1655, ending New Sweden forever. The Susquehannocks could no longer sustain themselves independently of Dutch friendship. They showed their capitulation in 1658 when they, like the Mohawks before them, exerted influence to end the renewed wars of the Esopus Indians of Hudson River against the Dutch. Reasoning with tribes whom they called tributaries, the Susquehannocks confessed that they had been forced "to submit to the Dutch or hide.35   Thus it came about that the Mohawks and Susquehannocks could fight fiercely in 1651, pursue parallel policies in 1658, and join together in the same conference in 1660 to pressure the still refractory Esopus Indians into submission. The turnabout of MohawkSusquehannock relations, so mysterious out of context, appears supremely simple against its background. The Mohawks had not won Susquehannock surrender, but the Dutch had.

From 1658 to 1662 was the period of maximum friendship between the Susquehannocks and Mohawks. The two nations then conceived their diplomatic roles in explicitly similar terms. In 1658 the Mohawks reminded the Dutch at Fort Orange "that at the time of the war against the savages they had gone down to the Manhattans and had done their best to preserve peace; therefore we too [the Dutch] were in duty bound to do the same for them while they promise to exert themselves in future as mediators between us and other savages." The Mohawks then demanded help against other Iroquois nations who were trying to break through the Mohawk cordon around Dutch markets.86 In 1662 the Susquehannocks asserted to the Dutch at Delaware Bay that they had "at all times let themselves be employed to mediate in differences between the Christians and the other savages, to which they still consider themselves obliged." They, too, wanted supplies on credit with which to fight their (nonMohawk) enemies among the Iroquois.37   It appears that the Susquehannocks attempted to control the Delaware market as the Mohawks attempted to control the Hudson market, and both had to fight the more distant Iroquois nations that tried to break their monopolies.

Map 2

English Conquest

   
  Notes:
25

Mohawk interception: Van Rensselaer's memorial, 25 Nov., 1633, Van Rensselaer Bowler Manuscripts, ed. and trans., A. J. F. Van Laer (Albany, 1908), p. 248. Montreal: Founding date, 17 May, 1642, Jesuit Relations 22: p. 211. Simultaneously Fort Richelieu was built on the Richelieu River to obstruct Iroquois access to the St. Lawrence. The alarmed Iroquois attacked the construction gang at once. Ibid. 22: pp. 277-279. That all this building was very consciously directed against Dutch interests as well as Iroquois is revealed by a letter of Charles Lalemant to Jesuit Provincial Etienne Charlet, Paris, 28 Feb., 1642, ibid. 21: pp. 269-271. See also the Introduction by Percy J. Robinson to François Du Creux, The History of Canada or New France (2 v., Toronto, 1951) 1: pp. xviiixix.

   
26

Hunt reasoned that the wars of the Iroquois were caused by the "exhaustion" of the beaver in Iroquoia by 1640 (p. 34). Though undoubtedly identifying a tendency, Hunt overstated its effect. His cited sources are susceptible to another interpretation than he gave them; namely, that the decline in Iroquois trade occurred because of increased French obstruction of Iroquois access to the Western beaver that had been of critical importance to the trade as early as 1633. French policy became more aggressive after 1640, culminating in the 1642 founding of Montreal, the significance of which escaped Hunt's attention. Yet Hunt dated "the true beginning of the long and desolating wars of the Iroquois" in 1642! (pp. 74-75). His exhaustionofthebeaver thesis is contradicted by a source listed in his bibliography. See Adriaen van der Donck, "A Description of New Netherlands" (2d ed., 1656), NewYork Historical Society Collections, 2d series (3 v., New York, 1841-1857) 1: pp. 209210. Van der Donck, as Sheriff of Rensselaerswyck, had handled thousands of skins and dealt with the Mohawks informally, commercially, and in formal diplomatic negotiations. As an expert on the fur trade, his authority must be ranked second to none. He did not arrive in New Netherland until 1642, two years after the supposed "exhaustion" of the beaver, and he stated that "in the NewNetherlands, and in the adjacent country, about eighty thousand beavers have been killed annually, during my residence of nine years in the country." Ibid., p. 221. See also pp. 126-127, 161, 170, 220-227.

   
27

Report of Andries Hudde, 7 Nov., 1648, and Report of Johan Printz, 20 Feb., 1647, The Instruction for Johan Prints, ed., Amandus Johnson (Philadelphia, 1930), pp. 255258, 132-133; "The Representation of New Netherlands," NewYork Hist. Soc. Collections, 2d series, 2: pp. 276-279.

   
28

Treaty dates: 1643: Ref. in minutes of treaty, 24 Sept., 1659, Minutes of the Court of Fort Orange and Beverwyck (1652-1660), ed. and trans., A. J. F. Van Laer (2 v., Albany, 1920-1923) 2: p. 215; 1645: Van der Donck, op. cit., p. 161. For an unsparing contemporary account of Director Kieft's war against the Esopus Indians, see "Broad Advice to the United Netherland Provinces" (1649), NewYork Hist. Soc. Collections, 2d series, 3: pp. 237-283.

   
29

Before the first MohawkDutch treaty in 1643, the Mohawks suffered from a shortage of firearms. In April, 1641, five hundred "well armed" Iroquois treating with the French possessed only thirtysix arquebuses. Those without guns were armed "in savage fashion." In December, 1644, however, a "Board of Accounts" in Holland reported that arms and ammunition "for full 400 men" had been sold to the Mohawks though firearms had been refused to other Indians in New Netherland. It is impossible to escape the inference that the pioneer 1643 treaty between the Dutch and the Mohawks had involved a deal in arms. The Holland Board, in making its report, decided to conciliate and satisfy the Indians in New Netherlands, and its action was followed by another treaty with the Mohawks in 1645. In that era there could be no "satisfaction" of Indians without trade in arms. The subsequent success of Mohawk warfare, which contrasts strongly with the Mohawks' bad showing before the 1640's, testifies loudly about the contents of the 1645 treaty. Paul Le Jeune, "Relation of 16401641," Jesuit Relations 21: pp. 33, 3637; Report of the Board of Accounts on New Netherlands, 15 Dec., 1644; N. Y. Col. Docs. 1: p. 150.

   
30

Minutes, 21 Sept., 23 Sept., and 2 Oct., 1650, Minutes of the Court of Rensselaerswyck, 1648-1652, trans. and ed., A. J. F. Van Laer (Albany, 1922), pp. 127-130.

   
31 At the treaty in Fort Amsterdam, 30 Aug., 1645, peace was made with the Indians of the lower Hudson "in the presence of the Maquas [Mohawks] ambassadors, who were solicited to assist in this negociation, as arbitrators." N.Y. Hist. Soc. Collections, 2d series, 1 pp. 275-276. My italics. It appears that the Mohawks had not fought as Dutch allies, although other Indians had been commissioned "to beat and destroy the hostile tribes." B. B. O'Callaglian, History of New Netherland (2 v., N. Y., 1855) 1: pp. 354-355.
   
32 Minutes, 28 June, 1652, Md. Arch. (Council) 3: pp. 276-278.
   
33

Amandus Johnson, The Swedish Settlements on the Delaware, 1638-1664 (2 v., Philadelphia, 1911) 2: pp. 582-584.

   
34 Report of Gov. Johan Rising, 1655, Myers, Narratives, pp. 157, 159.
   
35 Treaty minutes, 1518 Oct., 1658, N. V. Col. Does. 13: p. 95.
   
36

Fort Orange Council Minutes, 13 Aug., 1658, N. V. Col. Does. 13: pp. 8889. I use the term "nation" as an expedient to avoid anthropological controversy over the nature of a tribe. Certainly Indian "nations" cannot be properly compared to European nations, but if the term is understood to identify only a selfconsciously distinct political entity, it is preferable to the circumlocutions required in its absence.

   
37 Wm. Beeckman to Dir. Stuyvesant, 23 Dec., 1662, N. V. Col. Docs. 12: p. 419.
   

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